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mark field. The case of Carpenter v. Erie R. Co. 45 was an action by an
employee against an employer to recover damages for personal injury on
the theory of the employer's misrepresentation concerning medical care
requirements. The court held Section 43(a) to be inapplicable to such an
action.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing are the pertinent decisions to date interpreting or com-
menting upon Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. What will the future
decisions hold? Perhaps the section was drawn with an intention that it
be only a codification of the Grand Rapids case; 46 nevertheless, there is no
doubt but that the language of Section 43(a) is broad enough to allow a
court to regard it as a direct source of federal law with respect to false
designations of origin (an indication of origin being the basic function of
a trademark) or false advertising.
Will judicial decision lag behind highly developed and quickly chang-
ing business practices so that it might be possible for an individual to
trade with impunity upon the goodwill that another has created (even
though that practice would be considered to be a form of unfair competi-
tion in the present-day connotation of the word), since such a practice is
not of a nature that is remedied by state law? The possibilities are many.
Perhaps more courts will base federal jurisdiction on Section 44 of the
Lanham Act and find an indirect source of federal common law regarding
unfair competition based on the international treaties and conventions. It
would seem that the better way would be to use the direct and concise
wording found in Section 43(a). It seems that the only conclusion that
can be drawn is that from a legislative viewpoint there ought to be a fed-
eral law of unfair competition in order to arrive at some degree of uni-
formity.
From a judicial standpoint there is a variety of thinking, with the trend
perhaps slightly more toward the view that the federal district court does
have jurisdiction over matters of common law unfair competition. Cer-
tainly in any common law trademark litigation one might attempt to base
jurisdiction on Section 43 (a). Outside the trademark field it is doubtful if
such an attempt would be availing.
45 178 F. 2d 921 (C.A. 2d, 1949), cert. den., 339 U.S. 912 (1949).
40 127 F. 2d 245 (C.A. 7th, 1942), cert. den., 321 U.S. 771 (1943). See discussion in
footnote 25 supra.
WHEN MAY AN ARBITRATOR'S AWARD BE VACATED?
Arbitration, the submission of some disputed matter to selected persons
and the substitution of their decision for the judgments of the courts,' has
proved to be both an economical and efficient means for the settlement of
I In re Curtis, 64 Conn. 501, 30 At. 769 (1894).
CON . N'IENTS
controversies. To insure this effectiveness the courts have been reluctant
to set aside the awards of arbitration tribunals. 2 But both statutes and case
law agree that an award, otherwise binding may be set aside where it can
be shown that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, where a material
mistake appears on the face of the award, or where evidence of fraud is
present.3 Following is a closer examination of the above principles.
MISCONDUCT OF ARBITRATORS
The arbitrator is placed in the position of judge and jury, and as such
he must conduct himself discreetly and in a manner mindful of the con-
siderations of each party. Conduct which will impeach the decision of a
court will also suffice to vitiate the award of an arbitrator. Such behavior
can be divided into two areas. First, excessive use of the powers granted
the arbitrator by virtue of the submission, and second, actions which tend
to create an air of partiality.
Excess of authority.-" [T] he power of the arbitrator or referee extends
to just what the parties have agreed to submit and no more; and if he un-
dertakes to try other matters not submitted, the award is invalid."'4 The
rationale of this rule lies in the fact that by deciding issues not submitted,
the referee actually "usurps" the authority given him and such a judgment
is without legal force.5
An example of this "usurpation" of authority can be seen in Palmer v.
Van Wyck, 6 which concerned a dispute as to a breach of warranty.
There it was agreed that all matters of law be submitted to the court and
the matter of the amount of damages should be determined by three arbi-
trators. The court found that a breach of warranty had been made result-
ing in a great deal of damage to the plaintiff. However, the arbitrators de-
termined that only nominal damages be awarded. The award was vacated
on grounds that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority in not grant-
ing an amount commensurate with the legal finding of the court as re-
quired by the arbitration agreement.
In Leslie v. Leslie,7 two partners desirous of dissolution, submitted for
arbitration the question of which one would sell his interest to the other.
2 Roberts Bros. v. Consumers' Can Co., 102 Md. 362, 62 Atl. 585 (1894).
3 Hudson Lumber Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 124 Cal. App. 2d 527, 269 P. 2d 93
(1954); Gervant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 393, 118 N.E. 2d 574 (1954);
Draft State Arbitration Act, § 10; Uniform Arbitration Act, S 16.
4 Cook v. Carpenter and Cook, 34 Vt. 121, 126 (1861); cf. Friedland v. Friedland, 1
App. Div. 2d 129, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (1956); Doyle v. Hunt Construction Co., 123 Cal.
2d 51, 266 P. 2d 152 (1954).
5 Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103, 24 Atl. 319 (1892). Accord: Harnick v. Buffalo
Brake Beam, 204 Misc. 308, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (1953); Screen Cartoonists Guild Local
852 v. Walt Disney Productions, 74 Cal. App. 2d 414, 168 P. 2d 983 (1946); Bierlein v.
Johnson, 73 Cal. App. 2d 414, 166 P. 2d 644 (1946).
692 Tenn. 397, 21 S.W. 761 (1893). 750 N.J. Eq. 103, 24 Atd. 319 (1892).
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The arbitrators not only decided this question, but also determined that
the defendant was indebted to the firm, and provided terms of payment
of the debt. The court set aside this award on grounds that the arbitrators
had no authority to delve into past dealings of the firm and determine
issues not specifically submitted to them.
Hence, if the arbitrators merely find the facts requested, the award will
stand. But if they go beyond that which is submitted to them, the award
must fall.
Acts of the arbitrator amounting to partiality.-Generally, any act of an
arbitrator which might in some way prejudice the rights of one of the
parties is sufficient to impeach an award; this is true where only one of
the referees has been guilty of misbehavior. Thus awards have been va-
cated where an arbitrator had a personal interest in the outcome of the
dispute,' where an arbitrator visited the home of one of the parties during
the dispute,9 where the arbitrator had discussed the dispute freely with
another who had served as referee in a prior proceeding concerning that
dispute,10 and where two of the three arbitrators rendered an award with-
out contacting the third."
Nor will the law tolerate the refusal of arbitrators to entertain evidence
material to the dispute, for such refusal strikes at the very heart of the
purpose of arbitration in providing a fair and impartial hearing to the
parties. 1
2
Parties are entitled to be heard and present evidence before the arbitrators,
and depriving a party of such substantial right is misconduct that will render the
award invalid.' 3
These situations most frequently arise in ex parte hearings, where the
adverse party has no opportunity to rebut facts prejudicial to his cause.
Awards granted where such hearings have taken place are held to be
void.1
4
In Spitzer Electric Co. v. Girardi Construction Corp.,'15 the arbitrator
held ex parte consultations with his nominator concerning material facts,
8 In re Miller, 260 App. Div. 444, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 120 (1940); Schwartzrnan v. London
and Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 1089, 2 S.W. 2d 593 (1927).
9 Robinson v. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125, 20 N.E. 713 (1889).
10 Moshier v. Shear, 102 111. 169 (1882).
11 Jones v. Bishop, 218 I11. App. 318 (1920); Doherty v. Doherty, 148 Mass. 367,
19 N.E. 352 (1889).
12 Gregory v. Pawtucket Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 58 R.I. 434, 193 At. 508 (1937); Gian-
nopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P. 2d 353 (1932).
13 Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown v. Blitz, 57 Nev. 370, 64 P. 2d 1042, 1046 (1937).
14 Dukraft Mfg. Co. v. Bear Mill Mfg. Co., 151 N.Y.S. 2d 318 (1956); Whitehair v.
Kansas Flour Mills Corp., 127 Kan. 877, 275 Pac. 190 (1929); Curran v. City of Phila-
delphia, 264 Pa. 111, 107 Ad. 636 (1919); Hewitt v. Village of Reed City, 124 Mich. 6,
82 N.W. 616 (1900); Wilkins v. Van Winkle, 78 Ga. 557, 3 S.E. 761 (1887).
15 147 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 286 App. Div. 40 (1955).
COMMENTS
all to the exclusion of the other party and without his knowledge. The
Supreme Court of New York held such an award invalid because the ad-
verse party could not controvert matters prejudicial to his cause.
Private investigations on the part of the arbitrator are other instances
which foster partiality, and such behavior is fatal to the award.- " Stefano
Berizzi Co. v. Krausz,a7 is a case which best illustrates this principle.
There, a dispute arose concerning the quality of imported bamboo skew-
ers. After termination of the proceedings but prior to the decision, the
arbitrator conducted his own personal investigation without the knowl-
edge of either party. He obtained the opinions of several dealers in this
type of commodity and also solicited the criticisms of prospective pur-
chasers. On the strength of these findings the arbitrator rendered his
award. This was set aside on grounds that the personal investigations
prejudiced the adverse party in not affording him an opportunity to pre-
sent any mitigating facts.
Jessup and Moore Paper Co. v. Reed and Bros. is a case containing
similar facts. There, the arbitrator obtained the opinion of an undisclosed
person subsequent to the termination of the hearings, and conveyed this
opinion to the other referees. In vacating the award because of miscon-
duct, the court said:
A referee or arbitrator acting in a judicial capacity to hear and determine a
dispute is both judge and jury, and cannot without the knowledge or consent of
the parties receive testimony after having concluded a hearing of the parties.18
Thus, in cases where the conduct of the arbitrator has been found to be
unjustified, the award will be set aside, and it is immaterial that the com-
plaining party has not been damaged, or that the arbitrator has acted in
good faith; the misconduct per se is sufficient. 19
It is not his [the arbitrator's] own consciousness of rigid justice that can sup-
port his determination of the controversy, nor his conviction in his own mind
that he is so that can suffice. It is his external actions that will be subjected to
scrutiny; and if these do not satisfactorily bear the test, the award will fall.2 0
MISTAKE
As a general rule, arbitrators are the final judges of both law and
fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake in
either. 21 The exception to this rule arises when a palpable error of fact
16 Brotherton, Inc. v. Kreielsheimer, 8 N.J. 66, 83 A. 2d 707 (1951).
17 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436 (1925).
18 10 Del. Ch. 146, 87 Atl. 1011, 1012 (1913).
19 Jackson v. Roane, 90 Ga. 669, 16 S.E. 650 (1893),
20 Morse, Arbitration and Award, c. 19 (1892) (emphasis added).
21 Patriotic Order Sons of America Hall Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 107,
157 At. 259 (1931); cf. Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. Shannon, 377 Pa. 352, 105 A. 2d 55
(1955).
z'¢t DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
appears on the face of the award, or where it appears from the award that
the arbitrators intended to decide questions of law and have erred. Mis-
takes of fact generally occur through the miscalculations of figures, omis-
sions of words or the like. In such situations the award will be modified
or vacated as befits the facts.
22
To set aside an award on grounds of mistake of law, the submission
agreement or the award itself must show that the arbitrators intended to
decide questions according to the law and erred in so doing.23 The reason-
ing in such cases is that because of the mistake, the arbitrator did not in-
tend to reach the decision he has.
The party alleging error of law must be able to point to the award and say
that the arbitrator, as appears from the award itself, intended to decide the case
according to law, and has mistaken it, and that except for this mistake his award
would have been different.
24
In Roberts Bros. v. Consumers' Can Co.,25 the submission agreement
provided that the arbitrators determine all questions of law and fact, and
that the parties be given the opportunity of producing evidence from time
to time. A deposition taken for the complainant intended to be used as
evidence was sent to the arbitrators addressed to the complainant rather
than the referees as directed. The arbitrators refused to entertain this de-
position on grounds that it was inadmissible evidence having been ad-
dressed to the complainant rather than to them. The award given in favor
of the adverse party was vacated on grounds of mistake of law. The court
ruled that the rules of evidence cannot be construed strictly by arbitrators
since they are usually mere laymen, and a strict construction would defeat
the very purpose of arbitration. Here, the delivery of the depositions sub-
stantially met the terms of the submission agreement, and the refusal of
the arbitrators to allow this evidence was mistake of law on the face of
the award sufficient to render it ineffective.
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
"Fraud or corruption ... whenever discovered will furnish a sufficient
cause for vacating the award. '26 This is the universal rule.27 Therefore,
22 First National Oil Corp. v. Arrieta, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 309 (1956); Arcol Fabrics Corp.
v. Brenda Modes, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 700 (1947); Kutsukian v. Bossom, 270 App. Div. 396, 60
N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1946); Taylor v. Sayre, 24 N.J.L. 647 (1855).
23 Putterman v. Schmidt, 209 Wis. 442, 245 N.W. 78 (1932); Utah Construction Co.
v. Western Pac. Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 162 Pac. 631 (1917).
24 Fudickar v. The Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 401 (1875).
25 102 Md. 362, 62 Atd. 585 (1905).
26 Morse, Arbitration and Award 539, c. 19 (1892).
27 Carlisle v. McCleskey, 264 Ala. 436, 87 So. 2d 831 (1956); Hudson Lumber Co. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 124 Cal. App. 2d 527, 269 P. 2d 93 (1954); Commercial
Union Assurance Co. v. Parker, 119 111. App. 126 (1905).
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when bribery of an arbitrator is shown, 28 or he is otherwise influenced, -2 11
or if a party elects one interested in his behalf as a referee, 30 the award will
be set aside. And it is of no consequence that the party seeking to perpe-
trate the fraud failed in his attempt.
A party attempting by overt acts to corrupt or improperly influence such a
tribunal to make an award in his favor is not to be heard to say that he was im-
potent to accomplish what he sought .... 31
Perjury.-There is a conflict as to whether perjury is grounds for setting
aside an award. Many courts will not disturb an award in such cases,
reasoning that false testimony is intrinsic fraud, not appearing on the face
of the award, and thus is insufficient to have it impeached.
82
Other holdings have allowed proof of perjury to impeach an award.
3
Thus in Fire Ass'n of Phil. v. Allesina,34 an award was set aside where the
defendant had sworn that the amount of merchandise damaged in a fire
was much greater than was true. In Johnson v. Wells, 35 two partners
agreed to submit their dispute concerning a division of profits for arbi-
tration. The defendant had so manipulated the firm's records that it ap-
peared his partner was indebted to him when the opposite was true. These
records were introduced in evidence at the hearings, and an award made
in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the award was set aside on grounds
of perjury, the false records being the subject of the perjured testimony.
Constructive fraud.-A line of cases can be found which holds that
where there has been gross error or misbehavior on the part of the arbi-
trator, the award will be set aside on grounds of constructive fraud.36 An
example of this can be seen in Baldinger v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n.37
There a fire loss amounted to $1855.00. The amount granted in the award
28 Holt v. Williams, 210 Mo. App. 470, 240 S.W. 864 (1922).
29 Spurck v. Crook, 19 Ill. 415 (1858).
80 Ins. Co. of North America of Philadelphia v. Hegewald, 161 Ind. 631, 66 N.E. 902
(1903); Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, 137 N.Y. 137, 32 N.E. 1055
(1893).
31 Catlett v. Dougherty, 114 I11. 568, 573, 2 N.E. 669, 671 (1885).
32Jacobowitz v. Metselaar, 268 N.Y. 130, 197 N.E. 169 (1935); French v. Raymond,
82 Vt. 156, 72 At. 324 (1909).
33 Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 73 So. 188 (1916); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Alle-
sina, 49 Ore. 316, 89 Pac. 960 (1907); Craft v. Thompson, 51 N.H. 536 (1872).
8449 Ore. 316, 89 Pac. 960 (1907).
35 72 Fla. 290, 73 So. 188 (1916).
36 Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 253 S.W. 2d 629 (1952); Anco Products Corp.
v. T.V. Products Corp., 23 N.J. Super. 116, 92 A. 2d 625 (1952); Noffsinger v. Thomp-
son, 98 Colo. 154, 54 P. 2d 683 (1936); Kaufman Jewelry Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 172
Minn. 314, 215 N.W. 65 (1927); Rottman v. Toft, 187 Wis. 558, 204 N.W. 585 (1925).
87 121 Minn. 160, 141 N.W. 104 (1913).
-t , DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
was $470.00. This was set aside by the court which ruled that \%,here an
award is grossly inadequate, constructive fraud will lie.
In Woods v. Roberts,"8 an arbitrator granted an award which was quite
favorable to a widow, and later divorced his wife and married the widow.
Such behavior was held to amount to constructive fraud sufficient to im-
peach the award.
In all of cases of constructive fraud, it must be remembered that there
was no proof of actual fraud, but merely proof of the actions of the
arbitrator or the parties which raised the presumption.
CONCLUSION
While the general rule is that every intendment will be given in favor
of an award, yet the courts will set aside an award in cases of misbehavior
of the arbitrator, gross error of fact or law appearing on the face of the
award, or where fraud is present.
An examination of the various decisions indicates that not all courts
adhere to the above principles in so far as misconduct and error are con-
cerned, but subscribe to the doctrine of constructive fraud. The reason
lies, perhaps, in the fact that mistake and misconduct per se are not ac-
cepted as grounds for the impeachment of the award. However, to meet
the ends of justice, the court, instead of using gross error or misconduct
alone to vacate an award, will say that the gross error or misconduct in-
dicates the presence of fraud.
.18 185 111. 489, 57 N.E. 426 (1900).
